In this paper, the theory of parametric down-conversion in the Wigner representation is applied to Ekert's quantum cryptography protocol. We analyse the relation between two-photon entanglement and (non-secure) quantum key distribution within the Wigner framework in the Heisenberg picture. Experiments using two-qubit polarization entanglement generated in nonlinear crystals are analysed in this formalism, along with the effects of eavesdropping attacks in the case of projective measurements.
Introduction
It is well known that the process of parametric downconversion (PDC) has assumed great importance in the last few decades for the experimental implementation of quantum optics. Roughly speaking, we can consider two stages in the evolution of PDC experiments. On the one hand, for many years PDC has been used for the study of quantum aspects of light, such as photon entanglement and non-locality. In this sense, most of the Bell tests made during the last 25 years have used photon pairs produced in the process of PDC [1] [2] [3] . On the other hand, the great development of quantum information science in recent years is very well connected to the previous stage, so that PDC has become popular for the experimental development of the quantum theory of information, such as quantum cryptography [4] and teleportation [5] . As a matter of fact, Bell inequalities can be used in order to detect eavesdropping attacks in cryptographic schemes based on Ekert's protocol [6] . Recently, the necessity for loophole-free tests of local realism is getting a matter of great importance, and interesting theoretical advances in this issue have been produced [7] .
The process of PDC in the Wigner representation, along with the theory of detection, was developed within the Heisenberg picture in a series of papers [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . The whole formalism was applied to the experimental arena of Bell's inequalities and non-classical aspects of light, showing that the Wigner formalism provides an interesting and efficient tool, not only for practical calculations, but also for conceptual questions. The Wigner approach in the Heisenberg picture resembles the classical optics, in the sense that the field radiated by the crystal is generated via the coupling between the zeropoint field (ZPF) and the laser beam entering the nonlinear medium. The Wigner function is positive in this case, and corresponds to the Gaussian Wigner distribution of the vacuum state. Besides, the propagation of the electric field amplitude through the different optical devices between the crystal and the detectors is treated as in classical optics. Obviously, this treatment is purely quantum, there being two fundamental differences with the classical case. On the one hand, the zeropoint field has not a counterpart in classical optics; on the other hand, the theory of detection in the Wigner representation shows how the signal is separated from the zeropoint background. This subtraction is so efficient that cannot be explained in classical terms and gives rise to the typical and relevant results within the quantum domain.
In this paper, we shall apply the formalism to experiments on quantum cryptography using two-photon polarization entanglement generated in parametric down-conversion. In section 2, we analyse the relation between the concept of two-qubit entanglement and (non-secure) quantum key distribution in the Wigner framework. Section 3 is devoted to describe two experiments of quantum key distribution based on Ekert's protocol, and in section 4 we analyse the effect of eavesdropping attacks based on strong filtering measurement of the polarization.
Two-qubit entanglement and cryptography in the Wigner representation
The use of a type-II PDC source provides a direct way to generate entanglement, which is perhaps the most relevant property of quantum mechanics [14] . The quantum state generated in type-II parametric down-conversion, corresponding to the intersection of ordinary and extraordinary cones, after compensating for the birefringent nature of the down-conversion crystal, can be expressed by [3] 
where the bit value '1' is associated with extraordinary (horizontal) polarization, and the bit value '0' is associated with ordinary (vertical) polarization. The phase χ can take the values 0 or π, in order to produce any of the two EPR-Bell states (χ = 0 for |ψ + and χ = π for |ψ − ), and an additional polarization rotator can be placed in one of the two beams, in order to produce the other two states:
The states described by (1) and (2) can be used for practical implementation of Ekert's quantum cryptography protocol [15, 16] .
In the Wigner formalism, the radiated field is produced via the nonlinear interaction between the laser beam and the zeropoint field (ZPF) entering the crystal. In the Heisenberg picture all time dependence goes in the electric field amplitudes, while the Wigner function, which is positive, does not depend on time [12] . The quantum predictions corresponding to the state |ψ + are reproduced in the Wigner approach by considering the following two correlated beams outgoing the crystal [11] :
where i, i represent the polarization of the extraordinary beams and j, j the polarization of the ordinary beams. The description of entanglement made in [11] considered only the state |ψ + , but it can be easily shown that the two states |ψ ± can be described by means of the expressions
where χ = 0 (χ = π) stands for |ψ + (|ψ − ). Now, in order to generate the two states |φ ± , a polarization rotator at 90
• is placed at beam '1'. We have
where χ = 0 (χ = π) stands for |φ − (|φ + ). Now we shall show the relation between the entanglement (within the Wigner framework) and (non-secure) quantum key distribution. We consider the experimental realization sketched in figure 1. Type-II parametric down-conversion in a nonlinear crystal leads to the production of two correlated beams (corresponding to the entangled state |φ + ):
The beams '1' and '2' are transmitted to 'Alice' and 'Bob', respectively. They have polarizing beam-splitters (PBS) (which transmit vertical polarization and reflect horizontal polarization) and detectors. We have to consider the zeropoint field that enters the second channel of each PBS [17] . The consideration of the ZPF entering the PBS is related to the conservation of the commutation relations of the electric field operator within the frame of the Heisenberg picture, when the Hilbert space formalism is applied [18] . In this case, a vacuum field operator must be incorporated in order to keep such relations between the different components of the electric field operator when it is modified by the action of the PBS. When we pass to the Wigner function formalism, this corresponds to the consideration of an unavoidable ZPF which is uncorrelated with the signal entering the other channel. Although this field is subtracted in the detection process, it is a fundamental ingredient of the theory and cannot be ignored.
If
ZPF1 is the zeropoint field entering the second channel of PBS1, the fields at the detectors DT1 and DR1 are
where
ZPF1 which is reflected (transmitted) at PBS1. In the same way, the expressions of the fields leaving PBS2 are
ZPF2,T being the part of F (+)
ZPF2 which is reflected (transmitted) at PBS2.
The crucial property of entanglement (we shall refer to the state |φ + ) is that the results concerning the joint detection of the two qubits are completely correlated, in spite of the fact that if one of the two qubits is subject to a measurement, the result of this measurement is completely random. In the Wigner representation, these properties are easily explained via the application of equation (26) of [11] for the calculation of single detection probability, and the following expression for the joint detection probability (see equation (28) of [11] ) which will be used in the rest of the paper:
where λ and λ are polarization indices, and φ A and φ B represent controllable parameters of the experimental setup. means an average with the Wigner function of the vacuum. For instance, let us show the calculation of P DT1,DT2 and P DT1,DR2 (in order to simplify notation, we shall discard the dependence on position and time):
where we have taken into account that the ZPF inputs F (+)
ZPF1 and F (+)
ZPF2 are uncorrelated with the signals and with each other, and k DT1,DT2 is a constant which is related to the effective efficiency of the detection process. On the other hand,
In the same way, we obtain for the rest of probabilities:
and
From equations (16), (18) and (19), we have
In the case of perfect detection,
so that
Quantum key distribution in the Wigner formalism
The setup shown in figure 1 is not secure because an eavesdropper, usually known as Eve, could in principle measure the polarization of light by using a setup similar to Bob's, and re-send similar polarized pulses to him. For this reason, in order to establish a secure key and detect eavesdropping, Alice and Bob randomly select different polarization analysers by applying rotations or phase shifts [15, 16, 19] . Following the Ekert protocol [6] , they announce over a public channel which orientations were used for each particular measurement, but not the obtained results. In the case in which their measurements were compatible, they keep the results in order to establish the cryptographic key. The outcomes corresponding to non-compatible orientations are revealed and used to detect eavesdropping, by measuring the Bell parameter [22] :
The angular parameters α, α (β, β ) represent possible orientations or phase shifts at Alice's (Bob's) location, and this corresponds to the use of particular bases for measuring the polarization of the photon, when the Hilbert space formalism is applied. The value of |S| predicted by quantum mechanics is 2 √ 2, but the presence of Eve reduce the observed value of this parameter, so that |S Eve | 2 (if only one photon is exposed to the attack of Eve, the inequality |S Eve | √ 2 is fulfilled). If the presence of Eve is detected, the kept results will be discarded.
Here we shall study two experiments for quantum cryptography exploiting photon pairs entangled in polarization, one for polarization coding and the second for phase coding. Although these experiments are similar to the earlier tests of Bell's inequalities, we shall show in detail the calculation corresponding to the polarization coding, in order to explain the relation between (secure) quantum key distribution and the Wigner approach of PDC. The values of the fields at the detectors will be computed by propagating them through all the optical devices from the source to the detectors. For simplicity, we shall consider an identical distance separating the source from the respective optical devices and detectors belonging to Alice and Bob, so that the contribution of the related phase shift in equation (16) of [11] will be discarded in the calculation of the probabilities. These path differences would be relevant in experiments using phase coding and phase-time coding involving energy-time entanglement [20] .
Polarization coding
The first experimental implementation (see figure 2 ) uses active polarization rotators in front of polarizing beam-splitters [15] . The beams leaving the crystal, corresponding to the singlet state |ψ − , are (see equations (5) and (6))
The polarization rotator PR1 rotates the plane of polarization of F (+) 1 by an angle α. The field components behind PR1 are computed in the following way:
In the same way, the calculation for
The crucial property of quantum mechanics that can be used to thwart eavesdropping during the exchange of a cryptographic key is based on the Heisenberg's uncertainty principle: if the orientations used by Alice and Bob are compatible (the corresponding operators in the Hilbert space commute), then quantum mechanics predicts total anticorrelation. Nevertheless, this will not be the case when the respective orientations are not compatible (the corresponding operators do not commute). In the Wigner representation, these results are directly related to the change of the correlation properties of the light beams when they pass through the polarization rotators. In order to explain this point, we shall compute the different correlations between the components of F (+) 1 (r 1 , t 1 ) and F (+) 2 (r 2 , t 2 ) (for the sake of simplicity, we shall discard the dependence on position and time). We have
Note that, for α = β, the correlation properties of the propagated fields are the same as the corresponding to the fields outgoing the crystal. This result is very well connected to the fact that the singlet state |ψ − is rotationally invariant [21] . Nevertheless, in the case β −α = 45
• , all the correlations have the same modulus. As we shall see later, this implies that the four joint detection probabilities will have the same value.
By considering the zeropoint field that enters the second channel of PBS1, the fields at the detectors DT1 and DR1 are
ZPF1,T is the part of F (+)
ZPF1 which is reflected (transmitted) at PBS1. In the same way, the expression for the fields at Bob's detectors are
In order to calculate the joint detection probabilities P T1,T2 , P T1,R2 , P R1,R2 and P R1,T2 , we use equation (15) and expressions (33)-(36). After some easy calculations, we obtain
where k is a constant (in the ideal case k = 1/2 [15] ). Let us note that for β − α = 45
• the joint probabilities are P T1,T2 = P R1,R2 = P T1,R2 = P R1,T2 = 1/4 (see equations (29)-(32)). Finally, if we perform the summation of the four probabilities, we will obtain again the result given by equation (22) , for any choice of the angles α and β. 
Phase coding
The experimental setup is shown in figure 3 . The correlated beams leaving the crystal are given in the Wigner approach by (9) and (10) (corresponding to the state |φ (+) ). Each analyser consists of a wave retarder and a half-wave plate in front of the polarizing beam-splitters [16] .
The field F
(+)
1 (r, t) behind the wave retarder (which introduces a phase shift α between the vertical and horizontal field components) is
Now, the action of the half-wave plate (with the optical axis at 22.5
• ) corresponds to the rotation of the polarization plane of F 
Finally, the polarizing beam-splitter separates the vertical and horizontal components of the field. By taking into account the zeropoint field entering the other channel of the PBS1, which is uncorrelated with F (+) 1 , the field amplitudes at the detectors DT1 and DR1 are
ZPF1,T is the part of F (+)
ZPF1 which is reflected (transmitted) at PBS1. Similar expressions hold for the field amplitudes at the detectors DT2 and DR2 placed at Bob's location. We have Figure 4 . The eavesdropper is incorporated by using an elliptic polarizer that modifies the field corresponding to Bob's path. The zeropoint field entering the polarizer must be taken into account when the Wigner representation is used for the description of Eve's attack.
In order to calculate the joint detection probabilities P T1,T2 , P T1,R2 , P R1,R2 and P R1,T2 , we substitute expressions (41) and (43) into equation (15) . After some easy calculations, we obtain
where the proportionality constant, in the ideal case of perfect detection, is equal to 1/4.
Eavesdropping in the Wigner approach
In this section we shall analyse, in the Wigner representation, the perturbation that eavesdropping causes in the quantum key distribution. As a consequence of one of the most important basic aspects of quantum mechanics, that says that measurement implies the collapse of the state vector of the system, quantum cryptography is essentially secure. In this section, we shall investigate eavesdropping strategies corresponding to the strong filtering measurement of polarization. The Wigner approach gives an interesting way to understand how the action of the eavesdropper leads to the loss of correlation. Let us consider the situation corresponding to the second experiment described in the above section. We simulate the effect of Eve by placing an elliptic polarizer at Bob's location, where θ is the angle between the major axis of the ellipse and the horizontal direction and δ is the eccentricity (see figure 4) .
The field amplitudes of the detectors at the Alice location are given by equation (41), whereas the field corresponding to Bob's location is modified by the action of the elliptic polarizer [18] :
ZPF(Eve) (r, t) is the reflected part of the zeropoint amplitude that enters the second channel of the polarizer, and is related to the conservation of the commutation relations of the electric field operator in the Hilbert space formalism.
The action of Eve causes a modification of the correlation properties of the fields that can be detected via the measurement of the Bell parameter S. To illustrate this point in the Wigner approach, let us now calculate the squared modulus of the correlations between the different components of the fields corresponding to equations (7) (the unmodified beam 1 of figure 4 ) and (46) (the modified beam 2). These quantities will be proportional to the detection probabilities if a modification of the setup shown in figure 1 is made by considering the action of Eve at Bob's side. Taking into account that the field F 
Independently of the choice of θ and δ, the sum of the four probabilities, in the ideal case, would be equal to 0.5. This result is just one-half of the corresponding equation (22) , and reflects the fact that the action of Eve gives rise to the loss of correlation. In the Wigner function formalism, the correlation is lost via the vector projection of the field amplitude at Bob's side onto the characteristic direction of the polarizer. This description contrasts with the one that uses the Hilbert space formalism, in which the projective measurement changes the state vector of the electromagnetic field, which is represented in the Hilbert space of the two qubits. Let us note that the action of Eve implies the consideration of a ZPF entering the second channel of the polarizer. In this sense, Eve introduces a fundamental noise by placing the polarizer at Bob's side. We have to emphasize that, although this noise will be finally subtracted in the detection process, it is an essential aspect within the calculations, and cannot be ignored.
The field F 
ZPF2,R is the part of the zeropoint field
which is transmitted (reflected) at PBS2. Now, in order to calculate the joint detection probabilities P T1,T2 , P T1,R2 , P R1,R2 and P R1,T2 , we substitute expressions (41) and (53) into equation (15) . We also have to take into account that the ZPF inputs F (+)
ZPF1 and F (+)
ZPF2 are uncorrelated with the signals and with each other. After some algebra, we obtain
(54) C being a constant. On the other hand, X ≡ T 1 or R1 and Y ≡ T 2 or R2, and the sign '+' ('−') stands for transmission 'T' (reflection 'R'). For perfect detection, the value of C is 1/8.
Let us now calculate the Bell parameter (24) for α = 45
• , β = 0, α = 135
• and β = 90
• . By using equation (54), we obtain
Finally, let us consider the following two special cases, which have been studied elsewhere [16] .
Case I (δ = 0) corresponds to the use of a linear polarizer. From expressions (24) and (56), we get P XY (θ ) = C(1 ± cos α sin 2θ)(1 ± cos β sin 2θ), (57) |S| = √ 2 sin 2 (2θ).
For case II (θ = 45 • ), we have
|S| = √ 2.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have applied the Wigner representation to experiments on quantum cryptography based on polarization entanglement generated via PDC, and we have analysed the effects of eavesdropping attacks in the case of projective measurements.
We have described two-qubit entanglement for the four EPR-states that can be generated via the process of PDC, and studied a basic (non-secure) experiment for quantum key distribution in order to analyse the relation between the entanglement and cryptography when the Wigner approach is used. In this sense, the generation of cryptographic keys using entanglement is based on the correlation properties of two light beams.
The formalism has been applied to (secure) experiments for polarization coding and phase coding, in which different orientations for the polarization analysers are randomly selected. In this sense, the Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which is a basic principle in the usual Hilbert space formulation of quantum cryptography, is closely related to the way in which the correlations between the different components of the light beams change after passing the optical devices that characterize the Alice and Bob's setups.
We have analysed the effect of eavesdropping in the case of projective measurements, and we have shown how the action of Eve gives rise to a loss of correlation between the different components of the field amplitudes. In the usual Hilbert space description, the projective measurement is related to the loss of entanglement, and this contrasts to the Wigner description, in which the field is projected onto the direction of the polarizer, giving rise to the loss of correlation.
Finally, let us emphasize that, although this approach using the Wigner function formalism in the Heisenberg picture seems classical, the results concerning the joint detection probabilities are completely quantum, which is obvious. For instance, the eavesdropping attacks correspond to the use of different optical apparatuses whose action on the Wigner field amplitudes is treated in the same way as for classical optics. In this sense, everything resembles the classical case because the eavesdropping attack affects only the field at Bob's location, while the field at Alice's location remains unchanged. Nevertheless, the consideration of the zeropoint field entering the crystal, the PBS and polarizers, and its subtraction via the detection process are typically quantum phenomena.
The image that we get, which is consistent with the quantum theory, is that the action of Eve introduces some fundamental noise. This noise is important when the typical intensities of light are so small that only one photon can be detected because in this situation the fluctuations of the vacuum field are relevant in order to detect the eavesdropper. Nevertheless, if we were dealing with classical fields, in which the signals are so intense that the zeropoint can be ignored, the noise introduced by Eve would not be important and eavesdropping could be made successfully.
The formalism can be applied in the future to the study of other interesting aspects of the quantum theory of information and its implementation using PDC, such as quantum dense coding and teleportation.
Also, the consideration of situations in which Eve uses more sophisticated eavesdropping strategies, such as an attack with a quantum cloning machine or some kind of a coherent attack, can have an interesting interpretation using the Wigner function.
